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THE TRUTH-IN-NEGOTIATIONS ACT-AN EXAMINATION
OF DEFECTIVE PRICING IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Charges of excessive profitmaldng on government contracts have issued
from the Senate floor' and the nation's press2 and have provided the impetus
for recent congressional investigations3 and proposals for remedial legisla-
tion.4 Profiteering by government contractors is a problem of potentially
enormous dimensions since purchases by the federal government total more
than seventy-seven billion dollars-over ten per cent of the gross national
product.5 Because the greatest part of these purchases are made by the
Department of Defense, congressional action aimed at minimizing excessive
profits has focused upon Defense Department procurement activities under
the Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA). 7
The Government has determined that formal advertising is the most
economical and efficient method of purchasing,8 and ASPA requires the
use of this method "in all cases in which [it] is feasible and practicable
'See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. S5620-21 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1967) (remarks of Senator
Young); 113 CONG. REc. S7706-07 (daily ed. June 6, 1967) (remarks of Senator Prox-
mire).
2The most significant outcry from the press against excessive profits in Defense
Department contracting under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act is a series of articles in
the Cleveland Plain-Dealer written by S. Watzman and published on April 9-18, 1967.
These articles are reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. S5621-26 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1967).
3E.g., Hearings on Economy in Government Before the Joint Econ. Colmn., 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on Defense Contract Audit Agency Before a Subconn.
of the House Comm. on Govermnent Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hear-
ings on Defense Procurement Policies and Practices Before the Subconnm. for Special
Investigations of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
4 E.g., S. 1913, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (to provide the Government with access
to the accounting records of contractors); H.R. 12959, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (to
require certain contractors to certify that the price to the Government does not exceed
the highest price charged by that contractor to other purchasers).
5 Hearings on Economy in Govermnent Before the Joint Econ. Conmz., 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. I, at 3 (1967).
6 See SUBCOMA. FOR SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE Cosms. ON ARMED SERVICES,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., REVIEW OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND
PRACTICES, pt. 1, at I (Comm. Print 1968).
7 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1964).
8 STAFF OF JOINT EcoN. CoMMi, ., 90TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON EcoNOMY IN Gov-
ERNMENT 5-7, 45-48 (Comm. Print 1967). For a discussion of the mechanics of formal
advertising, see Dep't of Def. Presentation to the Procurement Subcomm. of the Senate
Cong. on Armed Services (Feb. 8-9, 1960) at 17-19.
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under the existing conditions and circumstances." 0 The Defense Depart-
ment has outlined the conditions which must exist before effective pro-
curement can be had through formal advertising:
(1) A complete, adequate and realistic specification or purchase de-
scription
(2) Two or more suppliers available, willing and able to compete
effectively for government business
(3) Selection'based on price competition alone
(4) Sufficient time to prepare a complete statement of the Govern-
ment's needs and the terms upon which it will do business and
[sufficient time] to carry out the necessary administrative pro-
cedures.' 0
The absence of any one of these factors in a particular purchase situation
necessitates the use of negotiated contracts instead of formal advertising.
Wartime exigencies in the 1940's first required extensive use of negotiation
as a method of purchasing. Since that time, the frequency of negotiation
has increased, and currently the dollar volume of negotiated procurement
far exceeds that of purchases by formal advertising. Of the over 121
billion dollars of services and supplies procured by the Defense Department
in the period from 1963 through 1966, eighty-five per cent were purchased
through negotiated contracts."'
In the negotiation of government contracts the major portion of time is
spent in arriving at the contract price. Individual contract terms and
clauses are in most cases not subject to negotiation by the parties because
they are prescribed by statute, regulation, standard form, or Government
requests for proposals.12  Furthermore, since many acquisitions involve
9 10 U.S.C. S 2304(a) (1964).
The requirement of formal advertising is designed to give all persons equal
right to compete for Government business, to secure to the Government the
benefits which flow from competition, to prevent unjust favoritism by represen-
tatives of the Government in making purchases for public account, and to prevent
collusion and fraud in procuring supplies or letting contracts.
34 Decs. Comptroller Gen. 551, 552 (1955), quoted in REPORT ON ECONOMY IN GOVERN-
MENT. supra note 8, at 5.
10 Dept. of Def. Presentation to the Procurement Subcoimn. of the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services (Feb. 8-9, 1960). 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1964) indicates specific excepted
situations in which contracts may be negotiated rather than formally advertised..
11 See REPORT ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT, note 8 supra at 49.
12See generally Cibinic, Contract by Regulation, 32 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 111 (1963);
Stone, Contract by Regulation, 29 LAw & CONTENP. PROB. 32 (1964); Whelan & Phillips,
Government Contracts: Emphasis on Government, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 315 (1964).
ASPA and the extensive Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), 32
C.F.R. 5§ 1.100 to 18.1001-4 (1967), issued under the authority of the Act, govern the
procurement policies and procedures in the Department of Defense. Many of the con-
tract clauses prescribed in ASPR are required in every government contract. More-
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products being manufactured for the first time, prices cannot be determined
by the normal forces of supply and demand. Consequently, the contract
price must be fixed after extensive negotiations based upon cost projections.
But government negotiators generally must rely on cost and pricing data
furnished by contractors.'3 There is often no independent standard to apply
to a contractor's estimates, and the private contractor is usually better
informed about past and future cost patterns than is the government ne-
gotiator. The opportunity for excessive profits through overstatement of
cost and pricing data is obvious.
In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, Congress passed in 1962
the Truth-in-Negotiations Act,14 an amendment to ASPA. The Act, which
over, a controversial decision by the Court of Claims, extending the import of this
requirement, holds that a contractor is bound by a "required" contract clause even
though the clause is not included in his contract with the Government. G. L. Christian
& Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 425-28 (Ct. Cl. 1963), aff'd on rehearing,
320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1964), motion for rehearing
denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965). This case is discussed in
Whelan & Phillips, supra, at 335-42. The controlling effect of ASPR on contract terms
has caused governmenr contractors to recognize that negotiation of contract clauses
must be carried on with the committee which promulgates ASPR rather than with
government negotiators at the bargaining table. But the actual impact of industry sug-
gestions is difficult to ascertain; the final decision is always made by representatives of
the Government. See Stone, supra, at 34-35.
'
3 See, e.g., SUBCOMM. FOR SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 6, at 1. This problem
is not peculiarly American. The British Ministry of Aviation has recognized that
access to contractors' cost and pricing data is necessary to combat excessive profits and
lower contract prices. See CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER & MiNISTER OF AvIATION, 2D
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE PRICING OF MINIsTRY OF AVIATION CoN-rAcrs (1965).
Although the British speak in terms of "equality of information" and access to con-
tractors' records rather than submission of data, the problem is much the same. Id. at
10. Concluding that little can be done to increase the number of contracts awarded
by competition, this report to Parliament has suggested a contract condition to ensure
"equality of information." Id. at 11. The goals of such a contract condition are similar
to those of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act.
14 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964). The Act, also known as P.L. 87-653, provides:
A prime contractor or any subcontractor shall be required to submit cost or
pricing data under the circumstances listed below, and shall be required to
certify that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data he
submit[tled was accurate, complete and current-
(1) Prior to the award of any negotiated prime contract under this title where
the price is expected to exceed $100,000;
(2) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification for which
the price adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount
as may be prescribed by the head of the agency;
(3) Prior to the award of a subcontract of any tier, where the prime contractor
and each higher tier subcontractor have been required to furnish such a
certificate, if the price of such subcontract is expected to exceed $100,000;
or
(4) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification to a sub-
contract covered by (3) above, for which the price adjustment is expected
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applies to procurements valued at approximately twenty billion dollars
annually,15 was intended to ensure that cost and pricing data submitted
by contractors is current, accurate and complete. Three functional require-
ments are included in the Act. First, the contractor must submit cost and
pricing data to government negotiators prior to the contract award.
Second, the contractor must certify that, to the best of his knowledge and
belief, the data is current, accurate and complete. Third, each contract
must contain a clause requiring adjustment of the contract price to exclude
any significant sums by which the negotiated price was increased because
the contractor's data was noncurrent, inaccurate or incomplete. Despite
the apparent simplicity of these requirements, implementation of the act
has generated congressional concern and extensive criticism."- This Note
will examine the legislative history of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act and
explore three problems presented by the statute: (1) certification of cost
and pricing data; (2) the Government's burden of proof with respect to the
causation requirement; and (3) the availability of offsets to the contractor.
to exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount as may be prescribed by the head
of the agency.
Any prime contract or change or modification thereto under which such certifi-
cate is required shall contain a provision that the price to the Government, includ-
ing profit or fee, shall be adjusted to exclude any significant sums by which it
may be determined by the head of the agency that such price was increased
because the contractor or any subcontractor required to furnish such a certifi-
cate, furnished cost or pricing data which, as of a date agreed upon between the
parties (which date shall be as close to the date of agreement on the negotiated
price as practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent: Provided, That
the requirements of this subsection need not be applied to contracts or sub-
contracts where the price negotiated is based on adequate price competition,
established catalog or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quan-
tities to the general public, prices set by law or regulation or, in exceptional cases
where the head of the agency determines that the requirements of this subsection
may be waived and states in writing his reasons for such determination.
15 In fiscal 1966 negotiated contracts totalling about $18 billion were awarded subject
to the Act's requirements; the estimate for fiscal 1967 is $21 billion. Hearings on De-
fense Procurement Policies and Practices, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 31.
10 Much of the criticism of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act has centered on the failure
of both the implementing regulations and the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals to fashion workable definitions for critical terms or phrases left undefined by
the Act. See, e.g., R. NAsu & J. Cimic, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAw 246-49 (1966);
Pettit, The Defective Pricing Law and Implementing Regulations-A Year and a Half
Later, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 552 (1964). The extent of the definitional problems is
illustrated by the uncertainty which.persists, after five years, as to precisely what con-
stitutes "data" which must be submitted by the contractor. The ASPR committee has
attempted to clarify the meaning of this term, see 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3 (e), but application
of the committee definition by the Board of Contract Appeals has resulted in tenuous
distinctions and increased uncertainty. Compare Cuter-Hammer, Inc., ASBCA No.
10900, 67-2 BCA 6432 (1967), witb Sparton Corp., ASBCA No. 11363, 67-2 BCA 6539
(1967), on motion for reconsideration, 68-1 BCA 6730 (price quotations from untried
vendors). Consideration of the problems posed by inadequate definition of terms is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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Background and Legislative History
Some question as to the purposes of the Act has existed ever since its
enactment.17 Disagreement has centered on the extent to which a con-
tractor's intent is relevant to the operation of the Act. It is possible to
conceive of the Act as a fraud statute, which merely relieves the Govern-
ment of the burden of proving fraud when defective data is knowingly
submitted by the contractor. On the other hand, one can assume that the
Act's function, regardless of the contractor's intent, is to obtain current,
accurate and complete data during negotiations. Legislative history is
inconclusive with respect to these conflicting points of view, but it suggests
that the Act, while originally intended by its sponsor to be a fraud statute,
has evolved into a tool for providing the Government with accurate data
during negotiations.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) provided the impetus for the
Truth-in-Negotiations Act by submitting extensive reports to Congress
on overpricing and excessive profits by government contractors.'8 Because
there was no legal basis for recovery of excessive contract payments, GAO
recommended "voluntary" refunds from contractors in many instances
where overpricing occurred.19 Largely as a result of this activity the De-
fense Department revised ASPR in 1960.20 The revision required contractors
to certify that their pricing data was current, accurate and complete-1 when
the amount of a procurement exceeded 100,000 dollars and the negotiated
price was based upon a contractor's actual or estimated cost rather than on
effective competition, established catalogue or market prices, or prices set
by law or regulation.
Congressional action soon followed the ASPR revisions. A billU 2 which
17 See, e.g., Joint Econ. Conmzi. Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 72.
Is E.g., Hearings Pursuant to § 4, P.L. 86-89 Before Spec. Subconmn. on Procurenent
Practices of Dep't of Defense of House Comn. on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
64-70 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 House Hearings].
19H. R. REP. No. 1344, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966). These efforts were well re-
ceived by Congress. See 1960 House Hearings at 64-70; Hearings on H.R. 5532 Before
Senate Cmnn. on Aroned Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings on H.R. 532).
Refunds resulted in recovery of at least forty-eight million dollars between 1957 and
1962. Hearings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before Subconnn. for
Spec. Investigations of House Corm. on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1963).
Compare Senate Hearings on H.R. 5532 at 21, where -Congressman Vinson estimated
the amount of recovery to be sixty-nine million dollars.
20 The text of this ASPR revision is reprinted in 1960 House Hearings at 145-55.
21 Id. at 152-53.
22 H.R. 5532, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. § (g) (1961):
No contracts shall be negotiated under this title containing a profit formula that
would allow the contractor increased fees or profits for cost reductions or target
cost underruns, unless the contractor shall have certified that the cost data he
1968]
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passed the House in 1962 required, inter alia, certification of cost and pricing
data for incentive-type contracts.2 This bill was sponsored by Congressman
Vinson to prohibit contractors from using padded figures in the negotiation
of these contracts. The Senate Armed Services Committee modified the
bill so that it extended to all types of contractual arrangements2 5 The
Committee was convinced that legislative action was necessary largely be-
cause of GAO findings which indicated that the ASPR certification
submitted in negotiations for the fixing of the target cost or price was current,
accurate, and complete; and such contracts shall contain a provision that the
target cost or price shall be adjusted to exclude any sums by which it may have
been found after audit that the target cost or price may have been increased as a
result of any inaccurate, incomplete or non-current data.
See also S. RE,. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
An earlier version of this bill, H.R. 12572, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), was passed
by the House in 1960. However, the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that
"[miost, if not all of the procurement problems in the Department of Defense can be
solved administratively." S. REP. No. 1900, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1960). Accordingly,
the Committee limited its action to making several recommendations to the Defense
Department. In response to one of these recommendations ASPR was amended in 1961
to require a contract clause providing for a price reduction when defective data inflated
the contract price. 32 C.F.R. § 7.104.29 (1961).
23 Three basic types of contracts are currently used in government contracting: cost-
plus, fixed price and incentive. At one extreme is the cost-plus contract, used primarily
for purchasing new or untried products for which there is little historical or projected
cost data. The contractor is reimbursed for all his costs plus a fixed profit or fee, re-
gardless of how inefficient his operations prove. The Defense Department uses this
type as infrequently as possible since there is little incentive for contractor efficiency.
Fixed price contracts, particularly firm fixed price contracts, are at the other extreme.
These contracts are negotiated at a specific price which will be paid to the contractor
even if his costs exceed the contract price. Procurement officials in the Defense De-
partment favor this type of contract. The incentive contract is a hybrid; it encourages
efficiency in procurement situations where cost data are insufficient to arrive at a firm
fixed price but are sufficient to avoid the cost-plus contract. An incentive contract in-
cludes a negotiated target cost and an incentive-sharing ratio. The Government and
contractor split any difference between actual cost and target cost in proportion to the
incentive-sharing ratio. For example, suppose negotiations result in a target cost of
$100,000 and a ratio of 80 to 20. If actual cost is $90,000 the contractor will receive
$90,000 plus an extra profit of 20%4o of the saving, which in this case would be 20%
of $10,000 or $2,000. Theoretically this bonus encourages contractor efficiency by in-
ducing him to keep actual costs below the target cost.
24 Congressman Vinson had charged that government savings from incentive con-
tracts are illusory because contractors pad their figures in order to arrive at a high
target cost and then receive a bonus for this padding when actual cost is less than the
target cost. See 1960 House Hearings at 429; H.R. REP. No. 1959, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
32 (1960).
25S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962). The Senate also adopted from
ASPR the $100,000 floor for contracts required to comply with the act and provided
that cost and pricing data would not be required when there is adequate price competi-
tion or established catalogue prices. Id. at 29.
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requirements were being ignored 26 This modified version of the bill passed
the Senate2 7 and became effective on December 1, 1962.
Thus while the Truth-in-Negotiations Act may have been intended
originally as a fraud statute of rather limited application, its scope and
arguably its function had broadened by the time it passed the Senate. In
fact, the Senate Armed Services Committee was aware that the Act might
extend to the innocent contractor whose defective data was entirely the
result of inadvertent errors. Congressmen Vinson and Hebert testified
before the Committee that "a truthful, honest contractor would have
nothing to fear under this bill. It is only that contractor [who] is concealing
actual information that he possessed at the time he negotiates that has
problems.... [N] o one is ever accountable for things he does not know." 28
Nevertheless, Senator Saltonstall expressed concern that a contractor might
be penalized because of changed facts or "held responsible for something
when he was really truthfully trying to carry it out." 29 And Senator Sy-
mington commented that the bill was not aimed at the "integrity" of the
contractor, but rather at his "efficiency and intelligence." 30 The House may
have already reached a similar conclusion. A House Report had stated
that "[fit does not make much difference . . whether the padding or the
inflation is intentional or unintentional, willful or inadvertent." 31
Much of the uncertainty with respect to the ultimate reach of the Act
was removed by events subsequent to enactment. On August 1, 1963,
prior to any interpretation by the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals,32 Congressman Hebert, the Act's sponsor in the House, introduced
26Senator Russell, chairman of the Committee, expressed his concern as follows:
I was very much concerned by the information and report on this bill by the
Comptroller General . . . about the extent of noncompliance with these regula-
tions .... If the Departments are not complying with these regulations which
were drawn... two years ago, I believe, I see no alternative for us but to under-
take to make it mandatory by passing a law on the subject.
Senate Hearings on H.R. 3532, at 46.
The GAO had found that of 276 negotiated pricing actions, 121, totaling 253 million
dollars, were negotiated without obtaining the cost and pricing data certificates required
by ASPR. Comaip. GEN. REP'. B-125050, REvIEw OF E=ENT TO WMHCH MILITARY PRO-
CUREMENT AGENcIES AND PRIE CoNTRAcroRs HAVE OBTAINED CERTIFICATION AS TO THE
AccuRACY AND COMPLETENESS OF CosT DATA USED IN NEGOTIATION OF CoNTRAcT PRIcEs
(1960).
27 108 CONG. Rzc. 17351 (1962).
28 Senate Hearings on H. R. 5532, at 25 (testimony of Congressman Vinson); id. at
57 (testimony of Congressman Hebert).
29Senate Hearings on H.R. 5532, at 25.
3o Id. at 26.
31 H.R. REP. No. 1959, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1960).32 For the charter and rules of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, see
32 C.F.R. § 30.1 (1967). The decisions of the Board have had a significant impact on the
implementation of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act because of the Board's role in the
"disputes procedure" for government contracts. This procedure is initiated by the inclu-
19681
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a bill33 which would have authorized price adjustments only when the
contractor knew that his data was inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent.34
The Department of Defense opposed this amendment on the grounds that
the Act was intended to rectify mistakes and not to punish dishonest con-
tractors,3r and the amendment was not passed. Failure of the amendment
seems to confirm a literal reading of the statute; the contract price will
be reduced regardless of the contractor's knowledge or belief. Furthermore,
the recent emphasis on post-award audits"e demonstrates that a contractor's
sion of a standard disputes clause in each government contract. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12
(1967). Claims which involve questions of fact must be submitted first to the contracting
officer, and his decision may then be appealed to the Board of Contract Appeals. See
generally R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMEN-E LAw 690-746 (1966); Shedd, Dis-
putes and Appeals: The Arnzed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CoNTmMp.
PROB. 39 (1964). Price adjustment actions under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act are gov-
erned by the disputes clause.
33 H.R. 7909, 88th Cong, 1st Sess. (1963).
34 109 CONG. REc. 13930 (1963).
35 A letter from John McNaughton, general counsel of the Department of Defense,
to Congressman Vinson expressed the opposition of the Defense Department to this
amendment. At page 3 of this letter the Department's interpretation of the impact of
the Truth-in-Negotiations Act is clearly expressed:
Subsection 2306(f) of title 10, U.S.C. provides that the contract price will be
decreased to exclude significant sums by which the price was increased because
of the submission of erroneous cost or pricing data regardless of whether the con-
tractor or subcontractor knew that such data was erroneous. Subsection 1(b) of
the bill would limit such adjustment to cases where the contractor or subcon-
tractor knew that the data was erroneous at the time of its submission to the
Government. The theory apparently is that the contract price should not be
adjusted if the contractor makes an honest mistake in his cost or pricing data.
This Department does not agree.
The price adjustment provision in subsection 2306(f) of title 10 U.S.C. was not
intended as a punitive provision, the application of which was to be dependent
on any finding of "guilt." Rather, its purpose was to require that where a price
negotiation was conducted on a mistaken premise (e.g., cost data which is later
demonstrated to have been non-current at the time of negotiation), the mistake
should be rectified whether or not it was an innocent mistake. A contractor should
not receive a profit based on defective cost or pricing data where he had the
responsibility of submitting correct data at the time the price was negotiated.
Moreover, to impose on the Government the burden of proving that the con-
tractor actually had knowledge of the error might effectively nullify the force of
this portion of the law.
A copy of this letter is on file in the offices of the Virginia Law Review.
3 6 In a series of reports to Congress beginning in February 1966, the General Account-
ing Office criticized the Defense Department's implementation and enforcement of
the Act. The February 1966 report indicated a need for post-award audits to detect
nondisclosure of cost and pricing data which was available prior to negotiation and
award of contracts. GAO REPORT B-158193 (Feb. 23, 1966) [reprinted in Hearings on
Defense Contract Audit Agency Before a Subcomm. of the House Corm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1967)]. This report indicated that audits
prior to contract award were not effective in disclosing cost estimates which were
excessive at the time of negotiations. In 1966 the Defense Contract Audit Agency, which
has been delegated the responsibility of enforcing the Act, initiated a program of post-
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liability depends only on empirical evidence of the accuracy of data and
not on distinctions betwveen intentional and inadvertent errors in pricing.
While the contractor's intentions may be relevant to punitive actions for
fraud or false claims under other statutes, his mental state has no bearing
upon contractual price reductions under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act.
The purpose of the Act is to obtain the lowest possible contract price by
obtaining accurate cost and pricing data from the contractor during
negotiations.
The Certificate of Cost and Pricing Data
The Truth-in-Negotiations Act requires each contractor to "certify
that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the cost of pricing data he
submitted was accurate, complete, and current." -, The regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the Act compel the contractor to sign a certificate of
cost and pricing data to satisfy this requirement.38
The statutory requirement of certification is of minimal utility. An
excessive contract price will be reduced regardless of the contractor's
knowledge and belief. It is anomalous to require a contractor to certify
that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, he has submitted accurate
data, and at the same time require a price reduction without regard to the
contractor's knowledge or belief. Arguably, retention of the certification
requirement is harmless since it does not hamper the adjustment of defec-
tive contract prices. However, this requirement has been a source of con-
fusion, and its elimination would ensure more consistent enforcement of
the Act.
The function of the certificate has perplexed the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals. The Board has stated that the certificate is under-
stood by the parties only to "evince an intent to certify that [the con-
tractor] has disclosed to the government negotiating team complete, ac-
curate, and current cost and pricing data for their use in negotiating
the contract."3 9 But the submission of complete, accurate, and current
award audits to determine contractor compliance with the law. Liability is now deter-
mined by an evaluation of the empirical evidence produced by these audits. Through
June 30, 1967, the Agency had completed post-award audits of 373 contracts totaling
$9,084.7 million and had discovered possible defective pricing in the amount of $27.8
million. Id. at 40. To strengthen this program, Senator Proxmire has introduced legis-
lation to assure access to contractors' accounting records. S. 1913, note 4 supra. The
Defense Department has amended ASPR so that Defense Department contracts author-
ize access to contractors' records. Defense Procurement Circular No. 57, at 3 8 (Nov.
30, 1967) [hereinafter cited as DPC No. 571.
37 10 U.S.C. 2306(f) (1964) (emphasis added).
38 32 C.F.R. 3-807.4 (1967). This certificate was recently modified by DPC No. 57,
which included an extensive revision of the ASPR regulations implementing the Act.
39 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280 at 24,850 (1965).
The fact that this decision was based on a prestatutory certificate is irrelevant to this
19681
Virginia Law Review
cost and pricing data is already required by law. Under this interpreta-
tion, the certificate merely evinces the contractor's intent to comply with
the law and is obviously superfluous.
Confusion concerning the certification requirement has been increased
by the Board's recent decision in Lockheed Aircraft Corp.40 In Lockheed
the subcontractor failed to disclose significant changes in cost and pricing
data received after execution of the certificate, but prior to final negotiation
of the contract. The subcontractor contended that his obligation under
the price reduction clause was dependent on the certificate of current pricing
data. The Board dismissed this contention:
It is our opinion that the certificate as filed.., plays no significant part
in appellant's responsibility under the defective pricing data clause.
The certificate and the clause are not interdependent but are inde-
pendent and each stands on its own. Perhaps there is a relationship
between the two and perhaps they were so intended. However, the
action to be taken under either, or the obligations under either, are
separate and distinct.41
The actual holding in Lockheed-that the Government's failure to request
a more current certificate does not relieve the contractor from liability
under the defective pricing clause and that the contractor's duty to disclose
significant changes in cost or pricing data does not cease when the certificate
is executed-is not troublesome. However, the Board's mention of "separate
and distinct" obligations under the certificate is perplexing. Neither the
Act nor its legislative history suggests any such obligations.
The Board's language may be attributable to the fact that, prior to
revision in October 1964, -the face of the certificate warned of possible
criminal penalties under a statute42 prohibiting knowing and willful mis-
representations to the Government.43 However, the Government may
prosecute under this statute whenever a party knowingly and willfully
falsifies a material fact. Thus even under this statute a contractor's liability
is independent of the certificate.
The Board of Contract Appeals has not been the sole source of confusing
applications of the certification requirement. In a case currently under
discussion; ASPR required price reductions whenever the contractor submitted incom-
plete, inaccurate or noncurrent data. See note 22 supra.
40 ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 6356 (1967).
41 Id. at 29,446.
42 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
43 See American Bosch Anma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA t 5280, at 24,843
(1965), for the text of the pre-revision certificate.
The warning of possible prosecution was deleted by an ASPR revision in 1964, and
the certificate currently in force contains no such admonition. 32 C.F.R. § 3-807.4
(1967), amended by DPC No. 57.
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consideration in a United States district court, United States v. Honeywell,
Inc., 4 the Government is attempting to use the certificate as the basis
for relief in a civil suit for double damages under the False Claims Act.45
The Government's complaint alleged that a false certificate of current pric-
ing data had been executed by a contractor who failed to disclose significant
changes in cost or pricing data which had occurred prior to the comple-
tion of negotiations. The Government further alleged that the Department
of the Navy relied upon the certificate and awarded a contract at a price
which exceeded what the Department would have awarded had the true
facts been furnished by the contractor. The vouchers presented for payment
were alleged to constitute false claims under the False Claims Act.40
Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the Truth-in-
Negotiations Act provides the Government with the exclusive remedy
of contractual price reduction whenever cost and pricing data are submitted
and a certificate is requested.4 7 The Government countered this argument
by asserting that defendant's false certificate, standing alone, would not
support an action under the False Claims Act, and that the basis for its
action was defendant's knowing presentation of false claims for payment,
not defendant's failure to produce accurate and current pricing data.48 The
court denied Honeywell's motion.4 9
The Government's burden of proof under the False Claims Act is different
from the burden which the Government must meet to obtain a contractual
price reduction under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act. An action under
44 Civ. No. 67-181 (M.D. Fla., filed May 1, 1967).
45 31 U.S.C. S 231 (1964). The act provides, in relevant part:
Any person... who shall make ... any claim upon or against the Government of
the United States . . . knowing such [claim] to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent
'*. shall pay to the United States the sum of $2,000, and, in addition, double the
amount of damages....
4 Complaint in United States v. Honeywell Inc., Civ. No. 67-181 (M.D. Fla., filed
May 1, 1967), paras. 4, 5, 6, 7.
47 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 17-
20, United States v. Honeywell Inc., Civ. No. 67-181 (M.D. Fla., filed July 7, 1967).
The contract in issue was executed prior to the passage of the Truth-in-Negotiations
Act but contained the pre-statutory ASPR version of the Price Reduction for Defective
Pricing Data Clause as well as the standard disputes clause.
48 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 3-5, United States v. Honeywell Inc., Civ. No. 67-181 (M.D. Fla., 1967).
But see Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition at 2, where
Honeywell contends that the pre-statutory provisions in ASPR, under which the con-
tract at issue was negotiated, provided a price reduction remedy when the contractor
"knew or reasonably should have known" that data submitted was "false or misleading."
This contention would be of no merit under current ASPR provisions.
49 United States v. Honeywell, Inc. Civ. No. 67-181 (M.D. Fla., defendant's motion
for summary judgment denied on Jan. 29, 1968).
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the former is grounded in fraud,5 ° and the Government must prove that the
defendant knowingly presented for payment false claims against the United
States.51 Contractual price reduction under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act,
on the other hand, is available regardless of whether the contractor knew
that the data submitted was defective. 52 Nothing in either the language of
the Truth-in-Negotiations Act or its legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended to preclude the Government from an action for double
damages under the False Claims Act. However, the Government's use
of the certificate of cost and pricing data as a basis for a False Claims Act
action is objectionable. The primary purpose of the Truth-in-Negotiations
Act is to achieve lower prices in negotiated contracts through increased
accuracy of cost and pricing data. The False Claims Act, on the other hand,
was intended "to reach any person who knowingly assisted in causing
the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud. . . ." 53 Each
act should operate only in its own sphere.5 4 To use the certificate as the
basis of a double damage action under the False Claims Act is to disregard
the scope and function of the certificate, as envisioned by the Truth-in-
Negotiations Act.55
Deletion of the certification requirement would lead to increased certainty
in the application of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act. However, while elimi-
nation of this requirement would appear desirable, retention of the certificate
could serve one useful administrative function. The Act provides for price
reduction when the contract price is increased by significant sums because
the data submitted by the contractor, "as of a date agreed upon between
the parties (which date shall be as close to the date of agreement on the
negotiated price as is practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or noncur-
rent ..... 51, The Government's experiences in selecting the date after which
data need not be submitted by the contractor have so far been unsatisfac-
tory. The date of certification could be used to establish this cut off date;
after execution of the certificate the contractor's duty to disclose would
cease. Since a recent amendment to ASPR requires that the certificate be
executed "as soon as practicable after agreement is reached on contract
50 See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Smith v. United
States, 287 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1961).
5' See, e.g., United States v. Priola, 272 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1959).
52 See text at notes 28-36 supra.
53 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544 (1943).
54 This contention is supported by the Government litigators. Plaintiff's Memorandum,
supra note 48, at 7-8.
55 Furthermore, using the certificate in a False Claims Act action may present self-
incrimination problems because of the Government's right of access to the contractor's
accounting records under ASPR. For a comprehensive treatment of the problems in this
area, see Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrhnination, 65
CoLUm. L. REv. 681 (1965).
56 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964).
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price," 57 use of the certificate for this purpose would fully comply with
the statutory requirements.
Advocating that the certificate date be used as the cutoff date is not
to suggest, however, that all data submitted must be current, accurate and
complete as of the certificate date. Certain data cannot be considered
reasonably available to the contractor as of this date. Overhead costs and
production records, for example, may be available to the contractor only
at certain periodic closing dates. The Defense Department has recognized
this problem and, in a recent amendment to ASPR, has provided that an
agreement on cut off dates for such cost items may be reached prior to
the date of agreement on price.5 s Thus the certificate, if retained at all,
should merely serve to establish a final date after which submission
of any further cost and pricing data is not required.
The Causation Requirement
The language of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act permits price adjustments
only where the Government shows a causal connection between defective
cost and pricing data and an overstated contract price. The Act provides
that the contract price shall be reduced by any "significant sums by which it
may be determined... that such price was increased because the contractor
... furnished cost or pricing data which . . . was inaccurate, incomplete,
or noncurrent.. . ." i9 Proof of causation has been one of the more trouble-
some requirements of the Act.
Since negotiations are conducted in a give-and-take atmosphere, it is
usually impossible to ascertain with certainty the effect full and accurate
disclosure would have had on the total negotiated price. Moreover, the
substantial delay betwueen negotiations and an appeal to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals or the courts makes proof of causation even
more difficult."° The effect of these factors is compounded by the Defense
Department's method of negotiating contracts on the basis of total price
rather than individual cost elements. The total negotiated price usually
does not specify the cost of individual items; it is virtually impossible to
prove that overstated cost data for a particular element resulted in an
57 DPC No. 57, at 11, anending 32 C.F.R. § 3-807.4 (emphasis added).
58 DPC No. 57, at 12, annending 32 C.F.R. § 3-80/.5 (a) (1).
59 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964) (emphasis added).
00 For a description of this problem in a particular factual setting, see American
Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280, at 24,845 (1965). This case
illustrates the difficulties caused by the negotiation and appeal procedure under the
Act in conjunction with a contract involving production of complex equipment,
several contract modifications negotiated under the pressure of delivery requirements,
and a five-year interval between negotiations and appeal. In these circumstances, hazy
memories are inevitable.
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increased contract price.61 Nevertheless, the Government has consistently
maintained that the total-price method of negotiation is more efficient
and economical than negotiation of individual cost elements.p Since the
majority of contracts negotiated under the Act are negotiated by this
method, 4 strict application of the causation requirement would seriously
impair enforcement of the Act
The Board of Contract Appeals attempted to alleviate this problem in
American Bosch Arma Corp.0I where the undisclosed data in issue involved
less than two-tenths of one per cent of the target cost.6 5 The Board felt
that an atteifpt to determine the actual effect of nondisclosure would be
mere "speculation," and instead applied a "natural and probable conse-
quences" test:
In the absence of any morespecific evidence tending to show what
effect the nondisclousre [sic] of the pricing data had on the nego-
tiated target cost, we are of the opinion that we should adopt the nat-
ural and probable consequence of the nondisclosure as representing its
effect.'6
The Board concluded that the "natural and probable consequence" of
nondisclosure of a reduction in materials cost was an increase in the negoti-
ated target cost of an equivalent amount.6r Consequently, the contract
price was adjusted to exclude the amount of the cost reduction.
In FMC Corp. 8 and Defense Electronics Inc0 9 the Board retreated from
61 Occasionally, however, negotiation memoranda may be available to indicate agree-
ment on particular cost elements.62 In American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280 (1965), the
Board outlined the Defense Department's position with respect to this method of
negotiation. The Department has determined that negotiation of separate agreements on
individual cost elements would hamper the use of fixed-price contracts and would result
in higher negotiated prices. The Department conceded that separate agreements on
individual cost elements "would facilitate price adjustments for defective pricing data,
but stated that it was far more important that the negotiated price be the lowest reason-
able price obtainable than that possible future price adjustments (which will always be a
small fraction of the total price) be made as easy as possible to compute ... .. Id. at
24,847.
63 Id. at 24,853.
64 ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280 (1965).
65 Id. at 24,852-53. The target cost of the contract was approximately $14 million and
the undisclosed data involved a total of $20,746.
66 Id. at 24,853.
67Id. at 24,852-53. The Board added that there was affirmative evidence that the
Government's materials cost estimate was based on the inflated pricing data, but this
evidence apparently was considered insufficient, by itself, to satisfy the causation re-
quirement.
68 ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA 5483 (1966).
69ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 5604, on motion for reconsideration, 66-1 BCA
5668 (1966).
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the position it had taken in American Bosch Arma. Although the Board pur-
ported to apply the natural and probable consequences test in Defense
Electronics, it held the Government to its burden of proving that a non-
disclosure of data caused an increase in the negotiated price:70 "It is in-
cumbent on the Government to show that the change order price adjust-
ment was overstated BECAUSE of the contractor's failure to disclose or its
improper disclosure of data." 71
The Board's retreat soon proved to be only temporary. In Lockheed
Aircraft Corp.72 a subcontractor failed to inform the contractor or the
Government that it had obtained firm prices on a substantial amount of
materials; nor did it disclose its material purchase orders to the Govern-
ment. The subcontractor contended that in the negotiations for the prime
contract the Government had relied on an auditing review by a Govern-
ment pricing team rather than on data furnished by the contractor or
subcontractor and, therefore, that responsibility for nondisclosure had been
assumed by the Government. The Board rejected this argument, found a
failure to disclose data and summarily determined that the natural and
probable effect of the nondisclosure was an increased contract price. The
fact that the Lockheed case involved unrebutted proof of a failure to dis-
close significant data apparently led the Board to lighten the Government's
burden of proving causation-a burden which was all but removed in
Cutler-Hamzer, Inc.73
In Cutler-Hammer a contractor failed to disclose a quotation for com-
ponents of a highly complex airborne reconnaissance system. The quotation
was significantly lower than that used in negotiations, and the contractor
admitted that the lower quotation was purposely withheld from the Govern-
ment. The contractor contended, however, that disclosure would have had
no effect on the negotiated price since the quotation was from an untried
vendor and since production difficulties were to be anticipated because of
industry unfamiliarity with the particular components.
The Board agreed with the contractor that, at the time of negotiations,
the quotation was not data upon which a definite price reduction could
have been reached. Nevertheless, it held that the contract price should be
adjusted. The Board found it unnecessary to determine the effect which
nondisclosure had upon the negotiated price and, instead, resorted to the
speculation which it had attempted to avoid in American Bosch Arma:
70 Id. at 26,206.
71Id. at 26,202 (1966), citing FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA
5483 (1966) (emphasis in original).
72 ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 6356 (1967).
T3 ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 6432 (1967).
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Of necessity, the very fact of [nondisclosure of the lower bid] to
the Government leaves us to conjecture as to what precise effect a
full disclosure might have had on these negotiations. However, since
it was [the contractor's] failure to disclose the information which
created this uncertainty, the consequence, if any, must be borne by
[the contractor] and not by the Government. 74
The Board recognized that it could not determine with certainty the
course of action which would have followed disclosure, but it was "con-
vinced that something contractually different would have been developed
to cover the situation as it then existed." 75
Although this reasoning seems to discard the Government's burden of
proving causation, the Board nonetheless proceeded to discuss the causa-
tion requirement and to conclude that the government had met its burden:
In Defense Electronics Inc..... we held that the Government'had
the burden of proving the causal relationship between significant,
non-disclosed, pricing data and the resulting contract price reduction.
However, we did not then, nor do we here, intend that that burden
be an unreasonably heavy one.
Accordingly . . . we are of the opinion that the Government has
established the reasonable probability that with a disclosure of the
[lower] quotation, the parties would have agreed that the cost of
the [component] would be excluded from the contract price, and
reserved for further negotiations and addition to the contract price
at a later date.7
Regardless of the Board's language, the Cutler-Haummer opinion virtually
eliminates the requirement that a causal relation be shown between a
failure to disclose and an increase in contract price. 77 Even if the Govern-
ment is required to show that disclosure of significant data would have
caused it to modify its method of negotiation, such evidence discloses
nothing with respect to any effect on the contract price. This conclusion
is supported by the fact that the Cutler-Hammer case was remanded for
further negotiations between the parties to determine the amount by which
74Id. at 29,828.
'5 Id. at 29,828-29.
-6Id. at 29,829 (citations omitte&).
77 In a later case the Board used language which could be interpreted as an indication
that the causation requirement has not been entirely eliminated. Sparton Corp., ASBCA
No. 11363, 67-2 BCA ,6539 (1967), on motion for reconsideration, 68-1 BCA 6730
(1968). There, the Board stated that the Government did not sustain its burden of prov-
ing that undisclosed data caused an overstatement in price. 67-2 BCA at 30,379. How-
ever, the causation requirement was not in issue since the Board determined that there
had actually been no overstatement in the price of the component involved. See note 94
infra and accompanying text.
(Vol. 54:505
Government Contracts
the contract price should be reduced. 78 The Board found the evidence
insufficient for this determination, although it had no trouble in deciding
that a reduction was called for.
Whatever remained of the causation requirement following Cutler-
Hamner was eliminated by a revision of ASPR to provide that "the natural
and probable consequence of defective pricing data is an increase in the
contract price in the amount of defect plus related burden and profit or
fee." -- The amended regulation further provides that the contract price
should be reduced by the amount of the defect unless there is a clear indica-
tion that the defective data was either not used or not relied upon.O Thus
the causation requirement has been displaced by the natural and probable
consequences test, which is now no more than a legal fiction by regulatory
definition.
The Board of Contract Appeals and the ASPR committee are, of course,
open to criticism for eliminating part of the statutory framework in which
they must operate. On the other hand, the fact that they have taken such
action should provide sufficient indication that the causation requirement
is an unworkable limitation upon enforcement of the Truth-in-Negotiations
Act. Because of the total-price method by which the Defense Department
usually negotiates its contracts and the delay between negotiations and the
ultimate resolution of price adjustment actions, it is virtually impossible
to prove a causal connection betveen defective pricing data and the
negotiated contract price. This difficulty not only hampers enforcement
of the Act in all defective pricing situations, but may even provide encour-
agement to contractors who would intentionally submit inadequate pricing
data. Deletion of the causation requirement would rid the Act of these
impediments. Furthermore, such action would stimulate all government
contractors, regardless of their propensity for violation of the Act, to
exercise greater care in gathering and submitting data and thus to further
the Act's goal of eliciting the disclosure of current, accurate and completc
pricing data. Moreover, while in any individual instance it may be impos-
sible to prove that a failure to submit current, accurate and complete data
actually caused an increase in the negotiated price, nondisclosure of such
data results in higher contract prices in the aggregate. Legislative elimination
of the causation requirement is desirable.
Offsets
While the Truth-in-Negotiations Act allows for downward adjustment
of contract rates which, have been inflated by incomplete or inaccurate pric-
ing data, it does not permit upward adjustment of contract rates when the
78 67-2 BCA q 6432 at 29,829.
70 DPC No. 57 at 12.
80 d.
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contractor's errors have tended to understate the contract price.81 This one-
way street appears justifiable since allowing upward adjustment in all cases
not only would insure the contractor against his own mistakes but also
might encourage him to "buy into" a government contract by purposely
underbidding. These objections obtain, 2 but with diminished force, when
a contractor can set off errors which understated the negotiated price only
against reductions in price necessitated by the contractor's overstatement
of cost items. Any advantages afforded the negligent or dishonest contractor
by such offsets must be balanced against the equitable treatment which
will be afforded to contractors generally.
'The question of whether or not to allow offsets has been one of the
most controversial problems under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act. The pre-
statutory version of the ASPR price reduction clause, which provided that
the contract price "shall be equitably reduced," 8 was broad enough to allow
offsets in appropriate cases. Thus in American Bosch rma" the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals allowed a contractor to offset certain
noncurrent pricing items, which would have reduced the contract price,
with other items which would have increased the price.85 In a subsequent
case, Lockheed Aircra-t Corporation,6 the Board disallowed the contractor's
contention that development costs and a royalty expense resulting from
a patent -infringement judgment should be set off against overstated material
costs. The Board emphasized that only offsets closely related to the costs
in issue were permissible under the equitable reduction clause:
It is obvious to us that these two cost items were only remotely
related to the "material costs" in issue . .. The obvious answer to
the offsetting suggestion is that the equitable reduction permitted
under the clause is intended to cover solely the cost items concerning
which the pricing data was defective. To permit unrelated offsets
would be tantamount to repricing the entire contract, which is not
within the contemplation of the clause.87
81 10 U.S,.C. § 2306(f) (1964). The legislative history is inconclusive with respect to
offsets. Opposition to offsets may be found in Senate Hearings on HR. 5532, at 100-02.
But cf. id. at 25, 27.
82 This problem was discussed in the Senate hearings concerning the Truth-in-Nego-
tiations Act. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on H.R. 5532 at 22, 33.
83 (Emphasis added). An example of the prestatutory clause may be found in Ameri-
can Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280 (1965) at 24,843.
84 ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280 (1965).
85 The Government, however, did not object to these offsets, and the Board treated
the issue as an agreement between the parties regarding the amount of overstatement
to be recovered by the Government.
86 ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 6356 (1967).
87 Id. at 29,450.
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After passage of the Act, however, the Defense Department adopted a
policy against allowing offsets. The Department opposed an amendment
proposed by Congressman Hebert in 1963 which, if enacted, would have
permitted offsets.88 Furthermore, after the Act was passed, the ASPR clause
was amended to provide that the price "be reduced accordingly"; 9 all
reference to "equitable" price reductions was eliminated.
The amendment of the equitable reduction clause was reflected in Cutler-
Hammer, 1nc., 90 the first Board decision to consider the offset issue under
the statutory price reduction clause. The contract in Cutler-Hammer called
for the design, development and manufacture of a highly complex airborne
electronic reconnaissance system referred to as the "Zero" system. One
of the steps in formulating the contractor's price proposal was the prepara-
tion of a "family tree"-a block diagram from which figures for the final
bill of materials were extrapolated. By comparing the bill of materials with
the family tree, auditors discovered errors which had caused duplication
in quantities of materials, and a resultant price overstatement.0 1 The
contractor contended that he could properly offset against the price reduc-
tion sought by the Government other errors which had caused understate-
ments in the price estimates. The Government opposed offsetting these
errors for the fundamental reason that the defective pricing clause does
not provide for offsets. The cost items which resulted in the understatement
and the overstated costs both involved purchased parts and components, but
despite this relationship the Board refused to allow an offset:
Although reasonable men may certainly differ on this interpretation, it
is our conclusion that the Defective Pricing Statute ... was intended
solely as a vehicle for recoupment by the Government of overpricing
resulting from any of the causes enumerated therein. On the other
hand, there are now and were prior to the enactment of that legislation
certain remedies available to contractors for the correction of mistakes
such as appellant proposes by way of counterclaims and offset here.
We must assume the Congress was aware of these remedial avenues
when it enacted PL 87-653. In this regard we have not overlooked
the fact that these remedies may be more restrictive than the cor-
responding remedy of the Government under the Defective Pricing
procedure. The simple answer to this is that both the statute and the
88 H.R. 7909, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Aug. 1, 1963).
89 32 C.F.R. § 7-104.29 (1967).
90 ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 6432 (1967).
91Using the vendor unit prices contained in the cost proposal, the Government
claimed that the overstatement in target cost amounted to $613,159. The Board sus-
tained the contractor's position that the unit prices had been based on larger quantities
and that, had a smaller quantity been used in the estimate, higher unit prices would
have resulted. Thus the overstatement was actually $75,000 less than the Government
claimed.
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contractual provision which it implements, literally limit the adjust-
ment to pricing deficiencies which tend to overstate the contract
price. As such we would need to be shown a clear Congressional
intent that all cost and pricing deficiencies, regardless of their nature
or direction, were correctable under the statute before we could
grant that relief here. . . . We are therefore constrained to adopt a
literal interpretation of the statute and, if we err, it is for others, be it
the Congress or the courts, to set the matter right.92
Although the decision in Cutler-Hamner appeared to establish the Board's
position on offsets, its two subsequent decisions in Sparton Corporation,"
involving price reductions under the prestatutory version of the clause,
require consideration. In Sparton the Government introduced evidence that
the pricing data submitted with respect to a component tube for a sonobuoy
did not reflect a discount from ninety-five cents per tube to seventy cents
per tube which the contractor had been able to obtain. However, the
contractor's data also indicated that only one tube was needed per sono-
buoy when, in fact, two tubes were required. Therefore, the cost of
ninety-five cents per sonobouy in the data submitted understated by
forty-five cents the cost of tubes per sonobuoy. The Government argued
that Sparton could not set off those mistakes which tended to reduce the
contract price against those which would have increased it. The Board
replied that this was not an offset at all, emphasizing that only one cost
item was involved. The contractor had represented only that the tube cost
per sonobuoy was ninety-five cents when in fact it was one dollar and forty
cents. Consequently, the Board reasoned, there had been no overstatement
in price.94
The Government feared that, notwithstanding the Board's characteriza-
tion of the sonobuoy as a single cost element, the decision raised serious
doubts with respect to the Board's position on offsets and moved for
reconsideration. The Board affirmed its earlier decision and found no conflict
between Sparton and either Cutler-Hammer or Lockheed. The Sparton
decisions are difficult to reconcile with the strong position against offsets
which the Board had adopted in Cutler-Havnmer.95 While the Board chose
to describe the sonobuoy as a single cost element, its balancing of an
92 67-2 BCA at 29,826-27.
93 ASBCA No. 11363, 67-2 BCA 6539, on motion for reconsideration, 68-1 BCA
6730 (1967).
94 67-2 BCA at 30,379, on motion for reconsideration, 68-1 BCA at 31,169-70.
93 The Sparton case, like Lockheed, involved the prestatutory clause, which provided
for an "equitable adjustment"; the Cutler-Hrnnner decision involved the statutory
clause, which provided merely that the "contract price be reduced accordingly." The
Sparton result could have been reached by the Board as an "equitable adjustment" of
the price of the contract in issue; however, on the motion for reconsideration the Board
held fast to its position that only one cost was involved. 68-1 BCA at 31,170.
Govenment Contracts
overstatement in unit price against an understatement in quantity actually
resulted in an equitable adjustment of the type which is normally regarded
as an offset.
In a recent amendment to ASPR90 the Defense Department has consented
to limited offsets. Under the new regulation offsets are allowed in only two
situations: (1) when there is a question as to the accuracy of a single item
of data representing an average or composite rate, overstatements in making
up the rate may be set off by understatements; and (2) overstated data
relating to a single item may be offset by understated data relating to the
same item. The regulation further provides that the contract price shall
be adjusted only if the net adjustment is downward.
Offset should also be allowed in a third situation. The contractor who
can demonstrate that some items have been inadvertently overstated, while
closely related items have been unintentionally understated, should be en-
titled to an offset. To prevent "buying in," the burden of proving that
understatements were unintentional should rest squarely on the contractor.
Although substantial discretion would be vested in the contracting officer
as well as the Board and the courts, clear standards should be promulgated
to indicate when the relationship between cost items suffices to permit
offsets. Cost items of labor or materials that are clearly unrelated should
not be entitled to offset treatment under any circumstances. A more liberal
approach to offsets is especially desirable now that the Defense Depart-
ment's natural and probable consequences test has virtually eliminated the
causation requirement. Whenever the contractor submits inaccurate, incom-
O DPC No. 57, at 13, amends ASPR 3-807.5 (3) to provide:
As a general rule, understated cost or pricing data shall not be "set off" against
overstated cost or pricing data in arriving at a price adjustment. However, where
there is a question as to the accuracy of a single item of data which is an average
or composite rate, overstatements in making up the rate may be set off by under-
statements for the purpose of correcting the rate submitted by the contractor.
For example, when the contractor in his cost or pricing data submits an average
rate for Class A Engineers and it is found that in the computation of the average
rate the contractor has indicated that his highest price Class A Engineer was
$20,000 when in fact it was only $18,000 and further when the contractor indicated
that the price of his lowest paid Class A Engineer was $10,000 when in fact it
was $12,000, these can be offset one against the other in recomputing the average
or composite rate. Offsetting a Class A Engineer average or composite against
a Class B Engineer average or composite is not permitted. Again, for example,
if an overhead account had been overstated by reason of a failure to use the most
recent available quarterly figures, the consequent downward price adjustment
should be based on the net change in the total overhead account, including both
the "minus" and "plus" elements. In addition, as a further exception to the gen-
eral rule against set off, overstated data (such as unit price) relating to a single
item (such as cement) may be offset by understated data (such as quantity)
relating to the same item. For example, if the historical data submitted is 100 feet
of pipe at $1.00 a foot for a total of $100 but it should have been 50 feet at $2.00
a foot, setoff is permitted and no price adjustment is required. In any case, the
contract price shall be adjusted only if the net adjustment is downward.
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plete or noncurrent cost and pricing data, he is subject to the unilateral
price reduction provided in the Act. Allowing offset of closely related
items, with proper safeguards, would mitigate the effects of eliminating
causation from the Government's burden of proof and would facilitate
more equitable treatment for the contractor.
Conclusion
During its gestation period the scope of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act
was quite limited-the act was intended by its sponsor merely to prevent
"padding" of cost estimates in incentive-type contracts. But as the Act
evolved, its base and function broadened. The Act now requires that
contractors submit current, accurate and complete cost and pricing data
and provides for reduction of the contract price without regard to
the contractor's culpability. The Act, as implemented, is no longer a fraud
statute; instead, it has become a tool for obtaining in a negotiated procure-
ment situation the efficiency and savings otherwise achieved by formal
advertising.
The Truth-in-Negotiations Act can be molded into a more functional
tool for improving the Defense Department's contractual negotiations. Im-
plementation and enforcement of the Act have been unnecessarily confused
by the requirement that the contractor submit a certificate of current cost
and pricing data. The certificate plays no substantive role in the operation
of the Act and should either be eliminated altogether or retained only to
establish a cut off date after which the contractor no longer has a duty to
disclose current pricing information to the Government. Furthermore, the
statutory requirement that the Government prove a causal relationship
between the submission of defective cost and pricing data and an increase
in contact price in order to obtain a price reduction is unrealistic. This
requirement has spawned the natural and probable consequences test, a legal
fiction which obviates the difficulty of proving causation in a particular
case. Price reductions should be available to the Government whenever it
can demonstrate that the contractor has submitted overstated cost and
pricing data. However, in order to promote equitable application of the
Act after causation requirements have been relaxed, the Defense Depart-
ment should allow offsets whenever understated and overstated cost items
are closely related and the contractor can prove that his errors were
unintentional. Adoption of the proposals presented in this Note should
improve enforcement of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act. In addition,
a firm yet equitable policy should increase the efficiency of pre-contract
negotiations and achieve economical solutions for post-contractual disputes.
M.J.G.
